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9 June 1954

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MOLOTOV's 8 JUNE SPEECH AT GENEVA
(Based on Preliminary Press Reports)

- I. Reiteration of position taken in restricted sessions.
 - A. Again demonstrates communists see no need for early cease-fire on other than their terms.
 - B. Indicates they more certain than ever that continuing military successes and French political settlement working in their favor.
- II. Molotov again maintains military and political settlements inseparable.
 - A. Has all along insisted "at least some" political problems connected with truce.
 - B. New element - concurrent discussion of political as well as military problems by Indochina sessions and by representatives of two commands.

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- C. Molotov specific suggestions - that talks consider "true independence" of three states, "free" elections and withdrawal of foreign troops--restates Viet Minh proposals of 10 May.

III. Acceptance of Molotov's terms would mean

- A. Withdrawal of all French troops.
- B. Built-in veto power in election and peace supervisory machinery.
- C. A communist dominated Vietnam, communist participation in Laotian and Cambodian governments.
- D. Establishing precedent which could be followed by communist sponsorship of "governments" for Burma, Thailand, and other SEA states.

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IV. Effect on France (always unpredictable)

- A. short run - possibly help Laniel temporarily - since speech took such uncompromising line. Will probably increase pressure on government for appeal to UN and for increased US and UK help.
- B. long run - damaging particularly if accompanied by more Communist military gains. May lead to new government and French capitulation.

V. Molotov warned US expansion of war might have "dangerous consequences."

- A. Toughest statement on this issue in past four weeks.
- B. Chinese had made similar statements in late April and early May.

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- C. Statements still less menacing than those prior to Chinese entry Korea.
- D. Communists don't seem to believe internationalization of war imminent.

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